

fication, did the Navy acquiesce in the defense reorganization of 1947. But it could not put away its fears of the Air Force challenge as readily as did its formal objection to a single executive department for the armed services.

The growing popularity of the Air Force with the public and in Congress, the successes of its public relations programs, the replacement of Forrestal with Louis Johnson, the cancellation of the flush-deck carrier, and the budget pressures against naval aviation in particular all fed the fears of the Navy about its future in aviation—which most of its top leadership were convinced was the basis for its claim to any future.

The immediate pressures upon the Navy came from the Truman Administration's expenditure policies. But it did not follow that naval officers would feel they either could or should attack the Truman Administration. To begin with, they were not advocates of high peacetime federal expenditures. They accepted as inevitable the fact that peacetime military budgets would be stringent, and as a judgment they could not dispute the claim that the American economy could not support a federal budget much larger than the current one. Moreover, for service officers in any official capacity the grounds within which they can advocate a larger military budget are highly circumscribed. Where the strong dogmas of civilian control do not inhibit advocacy, expediency warns that an appeal beyond the executive realm may backfire, and that even if it does not, a larger military budget is an enormous burden in persuasion to assume. The challenge to naval aviation posed, as the Navy saw it, by the Air Force and its aspirations, the disadvantages of criticizing their civilian superiors, and the necessity of accepting the general magnitude of defense expenditures directed the Navy spokesmen to attack the Air Force rather than Secretary Johnson or the Truman Administration.

SUMMARY OF THE TWO CONFLICTING CASES: THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARGUMENTS

The main arguments of substance were made by Navy and Air Force spokesmen, while the Marine Corps and the Army were concerned almost entirely about whether the Army was

trying to eliminate the Marine Corps. Bradley, of course, went further than a defense of Army motives, criticizing the Navy for a lack of co-operation under unification, and a failure of Navy leaders to explain the changing role of their service to its personnel. But he was testifying as JCS Chairman, not as a representative of the Army.

The arguments of the Navy and Air Force varied slightly from time to time, and were at times inconsistent with each other, as will be shown later in this chapter. But the main points of each can be summarized as follows:

The Navy Argument

1. Strategic Bombing: The Air Force. The Air Force has been concentrating all its resources on strategic (i.e., intercontinental area) bombing in the false expectation that in the event of another war it would assure a quick and easy victory. As a result, the Air Force has been neglecting tactical air power and air transport.

Contrary to Air Force claims, strategic bombing could not by itself win the war. Moreover, reliance upon it might actually precipitate a war, and its use could, rather than breaking the enemy's will to fight, actually strengthen it and make him less rational in his employment of force. Instead of being a quick and easy way to win, strategic bombing is warfare by attrition. These assertions are based upon an appraisal of both the accuracy and the power of strategic bombing. The elements which go to make up this appraisal include (1) the power of bombs, (2) the capability of delivering them, and (3) the accuracy of that delivery. Their limited number and power keep atomic bombs from rendering insignificant the factors of delivery and accuracy, both of which remain unsurmounted problems.

Strategic bombing is necessarily inaccurate and hence immoral in its unnecessary waste of human life. It does not have an important effect upon the outcome of war. For instance, it was tactical air power, not strategic bombing, that gave the most help in the allied invasion of Western Europe.

2. The B-36: The Air Force has publicized exaggerated performance claims for the B-36. Instead of being invulnerable, as the Air Force claims, the B-36 is actually a slow-flying and